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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Civil Procedure-FoRuM NON CONVENIENS-CLOSING THE GAP BE-
TWEEN THE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF RESIDENTS AND NONRESIDENTS IN
NEW YORK STATE
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules,
Rule 327 (McKinney Supp. 1972)
Silver v. Great American Insurance Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356,
278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972)
Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine embracing the dis-
cretionary power of a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when
it believes the action before it should more appropriately be tried in
another forum.' Application of the doctrine presupposes another forum
in which the action could be brought, and is grounded on both the
public interest in restricting litigation to cases bearing some relation
to the forum, and private interests, such as litigating where witnesses
are easily and inexpensively available.2
Acceptance of forum non conveniens by American courts was re-
tarded by the contention that the doctrine violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the United States Constitution." Although this
argument was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court 4 the legacy
I Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44 (1944); see Hayes v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Minn. 1948); Blair, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLUr. L. Rim. 1, 1 (1929); Develop-
ments in the Lan,-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 1008 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as State-Court jurisdiction]. The origins of the doctrine are obscure, although the
term forum non conveniens first appeared in Scottish cases in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALF. L. RaY. 880, 886-87
(1947).
2 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 880 U.S. 501, 506-09 (1947); accord, Cullinan v. New
York Cent. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 870, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Varkonyi v. Varig, 22 N.Y.2d 38,
887, 289 N.E.2d 542, 544, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (1968).
8 The courts maintained that the privileges and immunities clause guaranteed the
citizens of any state access to the courts of any other state. Thus, any use of forum non
conveniens which would deprive nonresidents of the right to sue when residents would
have the right was thought to violate this constitutional provision. Barrett, supra note 1,
at 889-90; State-Court Jurisdiction 1009-10. Apparently this view developed from the
early case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3280) (E.D. Pa. 1828), in which the
court stated that the "right . . . to institute and maintain actions of any kind in
the courts of the state" was one of the "fundamental" indices of state citizenship embraced
by the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 552 (dictum). Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions approved this dictum. See, e.g., Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 US. 698, 704
(1942).
4 See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 877 (1929).
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of prior uncertainty persists. Dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens is now a clearly permissible and useful procedure; yet, the
doctrine is not recognized in a number of states. 5
I
THE FORMER NEW Yonx RULE
Many of the states that have accepted the doctrine have not fully
utilized its potential. Forum non conveniens rules are generally-judge-
made,6 and the courts in many jurisdictions have developed exceptions
with regard to types of actions and classes of parties to which the
In Douglas the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute
limiting the right of nonresidents to bring actions against foreign corporations in New
York, although granting unqualified access to residents for this purpose. See notes 19-20
and accompanying text infra. The Court concluded that "resident" and "citizen" were
not equivalent terms, and that the distinction between residents and nonresidents was
based on rational considerations in the context of the case, provided that nonresident
New York citizens were placed on an equal footing with nonresident citizens of other
states. 279 US. at 386-87.
Subsequently, in Mayfield, the Court broadened the holding and rationale of
Douglas, stating that
if a State chooses to "[prefer] residents in access to often overcrowded Courts" and
to deny such access to all non-residents, whether its own citizens or those of other
States, it is a choice within its own control.... Whether a State makes such a
choice is, like its acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
a question of State law not open to review here.
340 U.S. at 4.
The reasoning of these cases has frequently been criticized on the ground that citizen-
ship and residence are usually coextensive, particularly in view of the fourteenth amend-
ment (U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1), which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 1, at 391 & n.50;
State-Court Jurisdiction 1010 n.656.
In 1947, the Supreme Court affirmatively approved the use of forum non conveniens
in the federal courts. See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518
(1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
5 See Barrett, supra note 1, at 393. Some states have considered and affirmatively
rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 124,
338 P.2d 747 (1959).
6 See, e.g., Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578
(1957); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152
(1933); Jackson & Sons v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 A.
895 (1933); Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954); Silver v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972); Gregonis v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923); Barnett
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 119 Ohio App. 329, 200 N.E.2d 473 (1963).
One important exception is Wisconsin, where the forum non conveniens rule is
statutory in nature. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.19 (Supp. 1972); cf. UNIFoRm IN SrA=TE
ITmNAIONAL PROCEDURE Acr § 1.05.
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doctrine will not be applied.7 Foremost among these exceptions are
limitations attached when a party is a resident of the forum state.8 An
example of such a judicially-created constriction was the New York
rule announced in de la Bouillerie v. de Vienne:9
Our courts are bound to try an action for a foreign tort when
either the plaintiff or the defendant is a resident of this State. It
is only when an action is brought by one nonresident against an-
other for a tort committed outside the State that our courts may
refuse to take cognizance of the controversy.10
Although de la Bouillerie dealt only with foreign tort actions, its
principle was soon extended to contract and property litigation,1' where
it had the anomalous effect of enlarging, rather than constricting, the
availability of forum non conveniens.12 Thus, de la Bouillerie came to
stand for the general principle that New York residents possessed an
unqualified right to sue and an obligation to be sued in New York
courts.13 The use of forum non conveniens was thereby limited to
7 For example, prior to 1952 New York held that forum non conveniens relief was
not available in any case based on contract. See note 11 infra. Arkansas has held the
doctrine inapplicable between counties of the state. See Hicks v. Wolfe, 228 Ark. 406, 807
S.W.2d 784 (1957).
8 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wiggins, 77 Ga. App. 756, 49 S.E2d 909 (1948);
Davis v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 134 Minn. 455, 159 N.W. 1084 (1916); Herr-
mann v. Franklin Ice Cream Co., 114 Neb. 468, 208 N.W. 141 (1926).
9 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15, rehearing denied, 300 N.Y. 644, 90 N.E.2d 496 (1949).
10 300 N.Y. at 62, 89 N.E.2d at 15-16.
11 So many of the cases applying the forum non conveniens doctrine are in tort,
that it was thought, or held, at one time that only tort cases felt the doctrine's im-
pact .... However, it is now clear that the courts have power, in contract and
other kinds of property litigation between nonresidents, to decline, as well as to
accept, jurisdiction.
Bata v. Bata, 304 N.Y. 51, 56, 105 N.E.2d 623, 625-26 (1952) (citations omitted).
12 Prior to Bata v. Bata, 804 N.Y. 51, 105 N.E.2d 623 (1952), the New York rule was
that jurisdiction could not be declined in any case involving contract or property liti-
gation, regardless of the residence or nonresidence of the parties. In Wertheim v. Clergue,
53 App. Div. 122, 65 N.Y.S. 750 (Ist Dep't 1900), the court stated that it knew
of no reason founded in public policy, and certainly nothing resting in precedent,
which will close the courts of this State to non-resident suitors who invoke
their aid against other non-residents sojourning within our borders for the
enforcement of causes of action arising out of commercial transactions and
affecting property or property rights. . . [W]e certainly do not intend to
establish a precedent which would shut our courts to great numbers of foreign
merchants, non-residents of the State, who may find their non-resident debtors,
fraudulent or honest, temporarily within our jurisdiction ....
Id. at 125-26, 65 N.Y.S. at 753; accord, McMahon v. National City Bank, 142 Misc. 268,
254 N.Y.S. 279 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931).
13 See, e.g., Burk v. Sackville-Packard Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 515, 285 N.Y.S.2d 214
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actions between nonresidents. This limitation remained in force for
tventy-two years, and has only recently been modified by the decision
of the Court of Appeals in Silver v. Great American Insurance Co.14
In deciding de la Bouillerie, the Court of Appeals apparently be-
lieved that restriction of the use of forum non conveniens was com-
pelled by prior decisions.15 In support of its holding, the court cited
Crashley v. Press Publishing Co.,"" in which it had upheld the right
of a nonresident plaintiff to maintain a tort action against a domestic
corporation, noting that
[a]s a personal action, sounding in tort, [the cause of action] was
transitory in its nature; following the person of the defendant. Our
courts were open to the plaintiff for the redress of any personal
injury, suffered by reason of the defendants' acts.' 7
Conversely, another case cited in de la Bouillerie, Gregonis v.
Philadelphia 6 Reading Coal & Iron Co.,18 had permitted a New York
resident to maintain an action against a foreign corporation on a tort
committed outside the state. Gregonis, however, turned on a New York
statute giving a resident the right to sue a foreign corporation on any
cause of action.19 The Court of Appeals construed this statute as a
(1st Dep't 1967) (per curiam); Export Ins. Co. v. Mitsui S.S. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 436,
274 N.Y.S.2d 977 (lst Dep't 1966) (per curiam); Franco v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 11
App. Div. 2d 643, 201 N.Y.S.2d 230, reargument and appeal denied, 11 App. Div. 2d 682,
204 N.Y.S.2d 81 (lst Dep't 1960).
14 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.YS.2d 898 (1972).
The Court of Appeals preferred to describe its decision in Silver as "relaxing" the
de la Bouillerie rule. Id. at 363, 278 N.E.2d at 623, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 404. This language is
consistent with, and adds force to, the court's caveat that a reviewing court must still
consider the New York residence of a party as an important factor militating against the
application of forum non conveniens. See notes 78-84 and accompanying text infra.
15 The exposition of the rule was extremely brief. At least in the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, the major issue raised in de la Bouillerie, and the only one given even
cursory consideration, was whether residence acquired after the cause of action arose but
before the institution of suit was sufficient to defeat forum non conveniens dismissal.
The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative. Although the issue of "after-acquired"
residence in time became one of the abuses which eventually prompted the re-examina-
tion of the entire resident-nonresident distinction (see note 48 and accompanying text
infra), it necessarily rested on the underlying premise so casually announced by the de
la Bouillerie court.
16 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904).
17 Id. at 82, 71 N.E. at 259.
18 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923).
19 This statute, with minor changes, is now codified as N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1314(a)
(McKinney 1968): "An action or special proceeding against a foreign corporation may be
maintained by a resident of this state or by a domestic corporation of any type or kind
for any cause of action."
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legislative demarcation of an area of subject matter over which juris-
diction must be exercised,20 provided that proper jurisdiction over the
defendant was also present.21
These precedents did not warrant the sweeping result reached in
de la Bouillerie. Crashley, for example, could have been distinguished
-primarily because it was decided in 1904, when forum non con-
veniens was a new and relatively unaccepted doctrine.2 2 Its preceden-
tial value is further reduced because the alternative forum in Crashley
was Brazil. The court may have been influenced in its decision by
serious doubts as to the plaintiff's ability to obtain redress if the action
were dismissed.23
Although Crashley may furnish some support for the proposition
that forum non conveniens relief is not available to a resident defen-
dant, Gregonis does not present a like obstacle in all cases involving
resident plaintiffs. Gregonis dealt only with a specific statutory excep-
tion-the case of a resident plaintiff suing a foreign corporation.2 A
Despite the de la Bouillerie court's implicit assertion that its rule
was merely a creature of precedent,25 the breadth of its decision can-
not be so easily explained. Rather, de la Bouillerie must be viewed as
as a concrete expression of the New York courts' long-standing interest
20 The Court of Appeals traced the history of the statute granting residents un-
qualified access to prosecute suits against foreign corporations. The court concluded that
the intent of the statute was mandatory rather than permissive. Finding no case law to the
contrary, it asserted that
[d]iscretion implies a power to make a choice. We do not think that as to a
resident of this state the court has any such discretion. The statutes from a very
early date have controlled or regulated somewhat the right of a resident to bring
an action against a non-resident corporation.
235 N.Y. at 156, 139 N.E. at 224.
21 See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 285, 200 N.E.2d 427, 428-29,
251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (1964).
22 See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
28 This inference is reinforced by the court's statement that the cause of action was
"transitory in its nature; following the person of the defendant." 179 N.Y. at 32, 71 N.E.
at 259. Such language is normally associated with the transient rule of jurisdiction. See
note 102 and accompanying text infra. Although not strictly applicable in Grashley be-
cause the defendant was a domestic corporation, the transient rule was developed as a
means of preventing defendants from avoiding their just obligations. See State-Court
Jurisdiction 1009. A later case which held that forum non conveniens could not be raised
by a resident defendant, Vigil v. Cayuga Constr. Corp., 185 Misc. 675, 54 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y.
City Ct.), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 934, 58 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Ist Dep't 1945), apparently pro-
ceeded on the similar theory that a plaintiff should be certain of at least one forum
in which he could bring suit. See State-Court jurisdiction 1011 n.668.
24 See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
25 See note 15 and accompanying text supra. But see notes 22-24 and accompanying
text supra.
[Vol. 58:782
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
in providing special consideration for state residents," a policy artic-
ulated as early as 1923 when the Gregonis court noted in dictum that
[t]he courts of this state [are] primarily for the residents of this
state. There must be some forceful and controlling reason entering
into the very nature and essence of the action which would close
their doors to its own citizens. 27
Although the de la Bouillerie rule has subsequently been modified,28
significant vestiges of this favoritism remain.29
II
DIFFIcuLnEs wiTH THE FORMER RuLE
A policy of strict refusal to allow forum non conveniens relief in
suits involving residents increasingly became recognized as an unaccept-
able method of protecting resident interests. When the rule was applied
to resident defendants, the paradox became obvious: the resident him-
self was seeking dismissal.3 0 However, even with regard to resident
plaintiffs, the rule was justifiable only if it could reasonably be assumed
that inability to obtain jurisdiction would effectively insulate the forum
from those claims having an insufficient nexus with the state to justify
their resolution there.
Such an assumption was questionable at the time de la Bouillerie
was decided;3 1 its tenability was further eroded by subsequent jurisdic-
26 See note 27 and accompanying text infra.
New York courts have justified the special consideration afforded to residents of the
state by characterizing the convenience of the courts as the basis of forum non con-
veniens. See, e.g., Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (2d
Dep't 1968); cf. Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 361, 278 N..2d 619, 621, 828
N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1972); Varkonyi v. Varig, 22 N.Y.2d 333, 38, 239 N.E.2d 542, 548, 292
N.Y.S.2d 670, 678 (1968). But see note 68 and accompanying text infra. Courts which
emphasize this rationale have been particularly prone to adopt forum non conveniens rules
discriminating in favor of residents, apparently on the theory that since residents sup-
port the state's court system through their taxes they should be permitted to make
greater impositions on the convenience of the court. State-Court Jurisdiction 1011 &
n.668.
27 Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 159, 139 N.E.
228, 225 (1923). This attitude of special solicitude toward residents has not been confined
to the area of forum non conveniens; it has strongly influenced other procedural develop-
ments as well. See note 45 infra.
28 See notes 62-65 and accompanying text infra.
29 See text accompanying note 79 infra.
80 This was the factual setting in Silver. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text infra.
81 Although the more sophisticated devices for subjecting defendants to jurisdiction
in a variety of forums had not yet developed (see notes 82-45 and accompanying text
infra), one significant exception, the transient rule of jurisdiction (see text accompanying
1973]
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tional developments. Several specific jurisdictional innovations were
cited by the Court of Appeals as justification for the re-examination of
the de la Bouillerie rule which it undertook in Silver.P2 Among these
innovations were the increased ease of securing personal jurisdiction
over a defendant pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 3 and the subsequent enactment of
the New York long-arm statute.34 Although the New York statute re-
quires that, as a minimum, the injury occur within New York, the
relaxation of due process requirements for personal jurisdiction served
to create a potential gap between situations in which jurisdiction could
be obtained consonant with due process, and situations in which it
should be exercised with reference to the considerations underlying
forum non conveniens.8 5
note 102 infra) was already firmly established. See State-Court Jurisdiction 1009. Perhaps
one reason the transient rule did not generate such great concern was that it was available
against only individual, not corporate, defendants. 1 A. EHRENzwEac, CoNFLicr OF LAWS
110 (1959).
82 It has become increasingly apparent that a greater flexibility in applying the
doctrine is not only wise but, perhaps, necessary. ... The fact that litigants may
more easily gain access to our courts-with the consequent increase in litigation-
stemming from enactment of the long-arm statute ...changing choice of law
rules ... and decisions such as Seider v. Roth ... requires a greater degree of
forebearance in accepting suits which have but minimal contact with New York.
29 N.Y.2d at 361-62, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
83 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe held that the due process clause
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
84 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 302(a) (McKinney 1972):
Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in
person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action
for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other per-
sistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
85 The statute permits the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
committing a tortious act outside the state in certain circumstances. Id. § 302(a)(3).
This provision generates the most potential tension between the policy underlying forum
non coveniens and that underlying long-arm jurisdiction. In these cases, the private
[Vol. 58:782
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The controversial decision of the Court of Appeals in Seider v.
Roth36 served to undermine further the assumption upon which the
de la Bouillerie rule rested. The court in Seider held that the con-
tingent liability of an insurer constituted a debt which might be at-
tached as the basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in New York.3 7 Since
the sole prerequisite to attachment was that the insurer do business in
New York, the claim underlying the attachment need have no connec-
tion whatsoever with the state. 8
Furthermore, increasing reluctance by New York courts to apply
traditional choice of law rules in transitory tort actions threatened to
deprive defendants of substantive advantages as well as to burden them
with defending in an inconvenient forum. For example, in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 the New York Court of Appeals held that
New York courts were not bound by a statutory limitation on damages
recoverable in a wrongful death action imposed by the jurisdiction in
which the injury occurred. Similarly, in Babcock v. Jackson,40 the
Court of Appeals refused to apply the guest statute of the place of in-
jury which would have barred any recovery.
Kilberi and Babcock themselves did little violence to the values
underlying enlightened forum non conveniens policy. Forum non con-
veniens dismissal would have been inappropriate in Kilberg, since
events central to the claim occurred in New York. 41 And in Babcock,
both the plaintiff and the defendant were New York domiciliaries, a
interests underlying the doctrine, such as accessability of witnesses (see note 2 and ac-
companying text supra), may often be best served by trial in the forum in which
the alleged tort was committed. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 US. 501, 508 (1947).
This potential for tension has not gone unnoticed by the courts. For example,
in Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 US. 867 (1949), the circuit court noted that "due process may be compatible with
situations of greater inconvenience... than those inconveniences which would support
the plea [of forum non conveniens]." 175 F.2d at 186.
86 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 812, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
37 See N.Y. JUDICIAL CoNFERNcz, SmEm ANNUAL REPoRT A 31-32 (1971) [herein-
after cited as 1971 REPORT].
38 The Seider decision has provoked substantial criticism among legal writers. See,
e.g., Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle,
71 COLUM. L. Ruv. 660 (1971). Even prior to Silver, however, the practical significance of
Seider was somewhat mitigated by the practice of removing such cases to the federal
courts and then transferring them to a more appropriate forum under the federal venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). This procedure was possible, of course, only when the
$10,000 jurisdictional amount required in diversity cases could be met, and left New York
in the rather embarrassing position of retaining the trifling cases but remitting the
substantial claims to their proper forum.
39 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1961).
40 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
41 See Carpenter, New York's Expanding Empire in Tort Jurisdiction: Quo Vadis?,
22 HAsrxNcs LJ. 1173, 1174 (1971); cf. id. at 1177.
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situation in which the state would appear to have paramount interest
in deciding the claim.42 The danger is that similar rules will be applied
to the detriment of defendants whose suits should properly be ad-
judicated in another forum.48 Indeed, this danger was realized in two
New York lower court decisions in which the Kilberg rule was invoked
against a Missouri defendent in a suit involving a Missouri auto acci-
dent" and against a Virginia corporation in an action arising from a
worker's death in Virginia.45
The practice of assigning claims to New York residents to insulate
the action from forum non conveniens dismissal also served to enervate
the de la Bouillerie rationale. Such assignments have been explicitly
approved by the courts,46 even when made for the sole purpose of pre-
cluding the court from applying the doctrine.47 New York courts have
also adopted a broad definition of "resident" in potential forum non
42 In Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), Chief
Judge Fuld, concurring, laid down the general rule that
[w]hen the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state,
and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine
the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
Id. at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532; accord, Neumeler v. Kuelmer, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
43 See Carpenter, supra note 41, at 1194-200.
44 Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298 N.YS.2d 175 (Ist Dep't 1969) (per
curiam).
45 MacKendrick v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 59 Misc. 2d 994, 302
N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The rationale of the MacKendric court, and the danger to
legitimate nonresident interests posed by New York's changing choice of law rules, is mani-
fested in the court's statement that "[c]learly, the public policy of our courts is to pro-
tect New York domiciliaries, wherever possible, from denial of recovery in another juris-
diction." Id. at 1011, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
One recent case, Neumeier v. Kuelmer, 81 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1972), appears to represent at least a partial retreat from New York's headlong rush
to extend the scope of its own law whenever possible. In Neumeer, the Court of Appeals
refused to ignore an Ontario guest statute in an action arising out of an automobile
accident occurring in Ontario brought by the administratrix of an Ontario domiciliary
against the administratrix of a New York resident. The rationale of the decision was that
the Ontario legislation should apply, at the very least, to an Ontario domiciliary traveling
within its borders, and that no substantive policy of New York would be advanced by
ignoring it. However, the court's statement that "New York has a deep interest in
protecting its own residents, injured in a foreign state, against unfair or anachronistic
statutes of that state" (id. at 125, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68) makes it doubtful
that similar restraint would be exercised if the situation were reversed, and a New York
domiciliary were suing an Ontario resident over an accident occurring in Ontario.
46 See, e.g., Wagner v. Braunsberg, 5 App. Div. 2d 564, 173 N.Y.S.2d 525, reargument
and appeal denied, 6 App. Div. 2d 790, 175 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1958); In re Banque de
France v. Supreme Court, 287 N.Y. 483, 41 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 816 U.S. 646 (1942).
4T See McCauley v. Georgia R.R. Bank, 239 N.Y. 514, 147 N.E. 175 (1924); accord,
Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. Markey, 124 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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conveniens situations; residence acquired after the cause of action arose
but before the institution of suit has been held sufficient to preclude
dismissal.48
An unwise forum non conveniens policy has drawbacks in addition
to those generated by its interaction with other procedural policies of
the forum. A litigant who is "locked-in" to an inappropriate forum by
such a policy has no recourse except to appeal in the hope that the rule
will be changed. Since the doctrine is not jurisdictional, an adverse de-
cision is entitled to full faith and credit and may not be collaterally
attacked.4 9 Moreover, continued adherence to an anachronistic and
parochial policy, particularly by an influential state such as New York,
can have a detrimental effect on interstate relations, since other states
may be prompted to develop similar rules from defensive or retaliatory
motives.50
III
RECENT C GEs-Silver ANm RULE 327
The increasing inequity resulting from application of the de la
Bouillerie rule did not escape judicial attention. As early as 1967, the
Court of Appeals suggested that the rule be re-examined. 51 Shortly
48 De la Bouillerie v. de Vienne, 300 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15, rehearing denied, 800
N.Y. 644, 90 N.E.2d 496 (1949). See also N.Y. JUDiCIAL CONFERENCE, FsEr HrH ANNUAL
REPORT A 114 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 REPORT].
A leading case emphasized this factor as a reason for applying New York law in a
choice of law situation. See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d
734 (1968).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNraar OF LAws § 84(g) (1971). Section 84(g) provides,
in pertinent part:
If a state chooses to exercise such judicial jurisdiction as it possesses despite the
fact that it is an inappropriate forum, its action in this regard is valid and will
be recognized in other states. As between States of the United States, this result
is required by full faith and credit.
G0 Such a possibility was noted in Export Ins. Co. v. Mitsui S.S. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d
436, 274 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Ist Dep't 1966), where the court argued that
[if our courts are to insist on jurisdiction where the dictates of fairness and
convenience indicate otherwise, we can surely expect foreign courts to do the
same, with the consequence that residents of this State will be forced to sue or
defend actions in foreign courts, which actions should appropriately be tried here.
Id. at 438, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 980-81.
51 See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 805, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
In Simpson, Chief Judge Fuld, writing for the majority in a reaffirmation of the Seider
doctrine, opined that
[u]nder the circumstances, it would be both useful and desirable... to conduct
studies in depth and make recommendations with respect to the impact of in rem
jurisdiction on not only litigants in personal injury cases and the insurance in-
dustry but also our citizenry generally. In the course of such studies, considera-
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thereafter, the New York Judicial Conference proposed a bill provid-
ing, in part, that "[t]he domicile or residence in this state of any party
to [an] action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing
the action."5 2 Although measures embodying this recommendation
were introduced at the 1969, 1970, and 1971 legislative sessions,58 they
failed to gain sufficient support on each occasion.
These failures were followed by a short period of strict judicial
construction of de la Bouillerie.54 Nevertheless, it was still against a
background of substantial injustice that Maurice Silver, a neurosurgeon
residing and practicing in Hawaii, filed suit in the New York Supreme
Court against Great American Insurance Company, a New York cor-
poration licensed to do business in all fifty states.55 His complaint al-
leged that Great American had defamed him and had participated in
a conspiracy to injure him professionally. Silver demanded injunctive
relief in addition to compensatory and punitive damages totaling four
million dollars.50
Great American moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
forum non conveniens, stating that the claim arose out of incidents
occurring in Hawaii, and in no way related to events occurring in New
York.57 The company further stipulated that it would consent to service
in Hawaii and would waive any statute of limitations defense that
might have accrued during the delay caused by the institution of the
suit in New York.58 On the strength of de la Bouillerie, the supreme
court denied the motion. 9 On appeal, the appellate division unani-
mously but reluctantly affirmed;60 however, it then certified the issue
tion will undoubtedly be given to the relationship inter se, of in rem jurisdiction,
in personam jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.
Id. at 312, 284 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
52 See 1970 REPoRT A 113. The same bill was sponsored by the Conference the fol-
lowing year. See 1971 REPORT A 81.
53 (1969) Sen. Int. No. 8168 (Mr. Hughes), (1969) Assy. Int. No. 4426 (Mr. Lerner);
(1970) Sen. Int. No. 3168 (Mr. Hughes), (1970) Assy. Int. No. 2289 (Mr. DiCarlo); (1971)
Sen. Int. No. 1642 (Mr. Hughes), (1971) Assy. Int. No. 8624 (Mr. DiCarlo).
54 For example, in Pharo v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 29 N.Y.2d 710, 275 N.E.2d 383,
825 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1970), the Court of Appeals held that the presence of a domestic corpora-
tion among multiple defendants did not preclude forum non conveniens dismissal as to
foreign corporations and other nonresident defendants.
55 See Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1972).
56 See id. at 359, 278 N.E.2d at 620, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.
57 Id., 278 N.E.2d at 621, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
58 Id. at 859-60, 278 NXE.2d at 621, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
59 See id. at 860, 278 N.E.2d at 621, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
0 85 App. Div. 2d 317, 816 NY.S.2d 186 (Ist Dep't 1970). The appellate division
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to the Court of Appeals, suggesting that since the de la Bouillerie rule
had been judge-created, it was susceptible to judicial reconsideration. 1
Thus prodded, the Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that
"reason and substantial justice" required that the former rule be re-
laxed, 2 stating that
[t]he great advantage of the [forum non conveniens] doctrine-its
flexibility based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case
-is severely, if not completely, undercut when our courts are
prevented from applying it solely because one of the parties is a
New York resident or corporation.63
Although the Silver decision left no doubt that the former rule
was no longer controlling, the contours of its replacement were left
imprecise. Henceforth, the court announced, the availability of forum
non conveniens in a particular case would "turn on considerations of
noted that, were it not for the dictates of stare decisis, it would have granted the motion
to dismiss. Id. at 817-18, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
01 Id. at 318, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
The judicial reversal of a previously well-settled rule of law requested by the ap-
pellate division has substantial precedent in New York practice. See, e.g., Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 194, 173 N.E.2d 778, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961) (abolished concept of privity
of contract as limitation on warranty); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 849, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951) (granted infants right to sue in tort for injuries incurred prior to birth).
This willingness to legislate judicially is particularly strong when the Court of
Appeals has exhausted its patience awaiting legislative action. For example, the court had
long refused to abolish intrafamily immunity for unintentional torts, arguing that
"[b]ecause of the changes envisioned by a repudiation of the rule, and because of the un-
precedented disposition requested, it [was] suggested that the Legislature take the initiative
in the area." Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 255 N.E2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530 (1969). However, legislative inaction prodded judicial action, and in GeIbman
the court abolished the immunity, stating that
[s]even years have passed since [the request for legislative action]. During that
period, there has been a judicial erosion of the intrafamily immunity doctrine
for nonwillful torts by courts of sister States. During that same interval, legislative
intervention has not been forthcoming. While I agreed with the majority in
Badigian [Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961)] that the
doctrine should be abrogated by the Legislature, I no longer adhere to that view.
As the courts of other States have indicated in abandoning it, the doctrine of
intrafamily immunity for nonwillful torts was a court-created rule and, as such,
the courts can revoke it. The inactivity of the Legislature since the time of our
decision in Badigian illustrates the fact that the rule will be changed, if at all,
by a decision of this court.
Id. (emphasis added).
Of course, the question remains as to whether the New York forum non conveniens
doctrine is entirely court-created, and is thus subject to similar judicial alteration. See
notes 70-72 and accompanying text infra.
62 29 N.Y.2d at 363, 278 N.E.2d at 623, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
63 Id. at 861, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03.
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justice, fairness and convenience"; 64 this determination would, in turn,
generally be "committed to the discretion of the courts below, to be
exercised by reviewing and evaluating all the pertinent competing con-
siderations." 65
Soon after the Silver decision, the New York Judicial Conference
moved to formalize its holding as a rule of court. The new rule, Rule
327,66 embodied the exact language which the Conference had pre-
viously presented to the legislature. It provided:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice
the action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the
motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in
part on any conditions that may be just. The domicile or residence
in this state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court
from staying or dismissing the action.
In addition to reaffirming such well-established doctrines as the
court's power to attach conditions to its dismissal,67 Rule 327 added one
significant reservation to the holding in Silver: it explicitly denied
courts the power to raise the plea of forum non conveniens on their
own motion. This limitation is sound, for it recognizes the practical
dependence of the court on the parties to supply the evidence necessary
to evaluate the appropriateness of the doctrine in a particular case. This
was not the rationale advanced in support of this limitation, however;
an earlier Judicial Conference report indicated that it was included
because "the convenience of the court alone should not be sufficient to
64 Id., 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that since the Silver appeal was on a certified
question, the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the case. Id. at 363, 278 N.E.2d
at 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 404. However, on remand, by unanimous vote the appellate divi-
sion predictably granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens.
38 App. Div. 2d 932, 330 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Ist Dep't 1972).
65 29 N.Y.2d at 861, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402, quoting Varkonyi v. Varig,
22 N.Y.2d 333, 337, 239 N.E.2d 542, 544, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (1968). In Varkonyi, the court
stated:
Among the pertinent factors to be considered and weighed, in applying the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, are, on the one hand, the burden on the
New York courts and the extent of any hardship to the defendant that prosecu-
tion of the suit would entail and, on the other, such matters as the unavailability
elsewhere of a forum in which the plaintiff may obtain effective redress and the
extent to which the plaintiff's interests may otherwise be properly served by
pursuing his claim in this State.
Id. at 388, 239 N.E.2d at 544, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
66 N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 327. Rule 327 went into effect on September 1, 1972.
67 See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 518, 275 N.Y.S.2d 274
(1st Dep't 1966); cf. Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 359-60, 278 NXE.2d 619, 621,
328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1972).
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bring this equitable doctrine into operation where all parties prefer to
carry on the litigation in this state."'6 s This statement ignores the fact
that a plaintiff's choice of forum is often motivated by inability to ob-
tain jurisdiction over the defendant elsewhere and not by personal
preference. The real reason that forum non conveniens is unavailable
in such a situation is that the sanctions which may currently be em-
ployed-stay or dismissal of the action-are completely ineffective
against a defendant who prefers to be sued in the inconvenient forum
and therefore makes no motion for forum non conveniens treatment.
Forum non conveniens relief for such plaintiffs must await the develop-
ment of an interstate system of venue transfer operating independently
of the transferee forum's jurisdiction over the defendant. 69
IV
SHORTCOMINGS OF REFORM
One serious shortcoming of the court's opinion in Silver was its
failure to deal adequately with the dual decisional and statutory under-
pinnings of the former forum non conveniens rule. Despite Chief Judge
Fuld's casual assertion that this rule was entirely court-created,70 a
substantial segment of it-that portion dealing with a resident plain-
tiff suing a foreign corporation-was the product of a statute still in
force and the interpretation of that statute. 71 Since controlling canons
of construction declare that this interpretation has become "as much a
part of the enactment as if incorporated into the language of the act
itself,"72 that portion of the rule was less amenable to judicial reap.
praisal.
68 1970 REPORT A 114.
69 Cf. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE LJ. 289, 312-14 (1956).
70 29 N.Y.2d at 363, 278 NXE.2d at 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
71 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
72 N.Y. STATUrEs § 72(a) (McKinney 1971). The statute provides that
[g]enerally, a judicial interpretation of a statute, having once been made is
binding on subsequent courts in accordance with the rule of stare decisis and the
doctrine of precedents, so that the interpretation becomes as much a part of
the enactment as if incorporated into the language of the act itself.
Id.; accord, People v. Ferguson, 55 Misc. 2d 823, 831-32, 286 N.Y.S.2d 924, 934 (Sup. Ct.
1968); Federal Land Bank v. Pickard, 169 Misc. 753, 9 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
The binding effect of the Gregonis precedent is unaffected by the fact that the
statutory provision it construed was subsequently twice repealed and simultaneously re-
enacted into different portions of the Consolidated Laws. The provision currently may
be found in N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1314(a) (McKinney 1963). Another statute provides
that "[t]he provisions of a law repealing a prior law, which are substantial reenactments
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There can be little argument that the new approach to forum non
conveniens exemplified by Silver and Rule 327 is far superior to the old
rule, and that this new approach is notably more consistent since it is
unfettered with the Gregonis73 exception. Further, the court's elision of
the statutory foundation of Gregonis is rendered somewhat understand-
able in light of the consistent misinterpretation of that decision 74 and
the fact that Silver was decided in the face of legislative resistance to, or
at least lack of enthusiasm for, forum non conveniens reform.75 Never-
theless, the statutory underpinnings of the Gregonis decision strongly
commend that this exception be squarely confronted by the Court of
Appeals or, preferably, eliminated by legislative action. 7 The need for
definitive disposition is reinforced by the fact that an argument can be
of the provisions of the prior law, are to be construed as a continuation of such provisions,
and not as new enactments." N.Y. STATUTEs § 373 (McKinney 1971).
73 Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223
(1923).
There is a substantial argument that Gregonis, in addition to having stare decisis
effect, was correctly decided. Two plausible interpretations of the statute which the case
construed are possible. The first, of course, is that adopted by the court: that the statute
represented a legislative mandate that jurisdiction be exercised whenever a New York
plaintiff sues a foreign corporation. The second is that the statute only blocks out an
area of permissible subject matter jurisdiction for New York courts. This second inter-
pretation has been expressly adopted by the Court of Appeals for another portion of the
same statute, N.Y. Bus. CorP. LAw § 1314(b) (McKinney 1963), which limits to five specific
situations the right of a nonresident plaintiff to sue a foreign corporation. See Simonson v.
International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 487, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). Simonson is a
completely proper interpretation of § 1314(b) because that portion of the statute narrows
what would otherwise be the limits of the courts' subject matter jurisdiction. To extend
such an interpretation to § 1314(a), however, would render that portion of the statute en-
tirely meaningless, since the court would have exactly the same scope of subject matter
jurisdiction in the absence of the statute. Such a construction would also be in conflict
with N.Y. STATuTEs § 231 (McKinney 1971), which provides that
[i]n the construction of a statute, meaning and effect should be given to all its
language, if possible, and words are not to be rejected as superfluous when it is
practicable to give to each a distinct and separate meaning,
since the alternative interpretation adopted in Gregonis is also available.
74 For example, the New York Judicial Conference, citing Gregonis, remarked:
[O]ne rather arbitrary and dearly inequitable rule has been gradually engrafted
upon the forum non conveniens doctrine-namely, the rule that, no matter what
the circumstances may be, the doctrine is inapplicable whenever the plaintiff is a
New York resident.
1970 REPORT A 113-14.
75 See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
78 It seems improbable at this late date that the Court of Appeals would hold that
Gregonis still controlled. Should legislative action be desired to remove any remaining
doubt, however, it might be substantially easier to achieve since Silver has reversed the
polarity of forum non conveniens policy. Although Gregonis previously represented only a
single segment of a monolithic rule, it would now stand out as an unwarranted exception
to general policy.
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made that Silver may be read consistently with the survival of this statu-
tory exception.77
From a practical standpoint, a more distressing defect of Silver is
the omission of standards for delineating the proper balance between
the new forum non conveniens approach and the longstanding court
policy of extending special consideration to state residents.7 The state-
ment in Silver that "residence is, of course, an important factor to be
considered"7 9 demonstrates that the protection of residents remains an
important judicial policy in New York. It is also significant that in
Silver the defendant was a New York resident-a factual context in
which the defendant's plea of forum non conveniens is not only inher-
ently weak,80 but also one in which the resident protection rationale has
no validity.81 Yet neither the Silver opinion nor Rule 327 provides lower
courts with any criteria for accommodating these inherently conflicting
policies. Although the value of any pro-resident bias in a modem pro-
cedural system is doubtful,8 2 the Court of Appeals should at least have
instructed lower courts to deny residence consideration in those cases in
which the claim has been assigned to a New York resident" or in which
77 Such an argument might proceed as follows: Gregonis contains both a narrow
statutory holding and broader dicta, such as that quoted in the text accompanying note
27 supra. Although the holding is treated as "part of the enactment," and is thus entitled
to precedential deference, its dicta are not. See N.Y. STATurEs § 72 (McKinney 1971).
On the other hand, although the defendant in Silver requested that Gregonis, Crash-
ley, and de la Bouillerie be overruled (see 29 N.Y.2d at 358, 278 N.E.2d at 620, 328
N.Y.S.2d at 400), the Court of Appeals carefully noted that its holding was intended only
to modify them. Id. at 363, 278 N.E.2d at 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 404. The justification ad-
vanced for the holding was that stare decisis did not compel the court "to follow blindly
a court-created rule." Id. From these facts it might be argued that Silver only modified
Gregonis to the extent that it was a "court-created rule," and thus was not entitled to stare
decisis deference. Its holding would thus remain controlling authority.
78 See note 45 and text accompanying note 27 supra.
79 29 N.Y.2d at 361, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
80 It might be argued that the state of the defendant's domicile should be considered
a convenient forum per se, at least as far as objection by the defendant is concerned. Cf.
Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflict of Laws: Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's
Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. PuB. L. 313, 324 n.55 (1960). Contra, State-
Court Jurisdiction 1011-13.
81 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
It may be more than coincidental that the two other states which have modified
similar forum non conveniens policies by judicial decision did so in cases in which the
plea was raised by a resident defendant. See Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 52 Del. 161,
154 A.2d 561 (1958); Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1954).
82 See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
83 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. One post-Silver case has made such
a distinction. See Taurus, Inc. v. Boeck Fuel Co., 38 App. Div. 2d 702, 328 N.Y.S.2d 366,
modified, 39 App. Div. 2d 519, 330 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't 1972).
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residence was acquired after the cause of action arose. 4 In these cases,
special consideration serves the purpose of neither enlightened forum
non conveniens policy nor the protection of bona fide resident interests.
More explicit standards would also prove useful in minimizing judicial
overreaching in the application of New York's liberal choice of law
rules. 85
V
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT
Although Silver and Rule 327 represent a significant reform, much
remains to be done before New York can be recognized as having a
truly progressive forum non conveniens policy. Elimination of the
pervasive resident-nonresident distinction has exposed other forum non
conveniens issues which also require reappraisal. An example is the New
York attitude toward forum selection clauses in contracts. The current
view is that although such clauses may be honored in exceptional cir-
cumstances, 86 they are contrary to public policy insofar as they attempt
to oust New York courts of their valid jurisdiction. 87 The deficiencies
of this attitude were not particularly apparent when forum selection
clauses could not be enforced by or against a resident. But in light of
Silver, such a view must be considered somewhat parochial, especially
when one considers that the Uniform Commercial Code grants contrac-
tual parties the right, within reasonable limits, to stipulate the law
which will control any dispute.8 Thus, failure to enforce the forum
84 See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
85 See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
86 "There may conceivably be exceptional circumstances where resort to the courts
of another state is so obviously convenient and reasonable as to justify our own courts in
yielding to the agreement of the parties and declining jurisdiction." Meacham v. James-
town, F. & C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 358, 105 N.E. 653, 655 (1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
87 Under the present state of the New York authorities, a contract or agreement
which attempts to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the courts of another state
or country to the exclusion of the New York courts will be declared to be void as
against public policy, if it is attempted to be set up as a bar to an action which
would otherwise be maintainable in New York ....
Kyler v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 12 App. Div. 2d 874, 874, 210 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26-27
(4th Dep't 1961) (citations omitted).
88 N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (McKinney 1964) provides:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to trans-
actions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
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selection clause will often result in requiring New York courts to apply
foreign law.89
Another issue deserving more definitive treatment by the Court of
Appeals is the availability of forum non conveniens relief against a
plaintiff if a more convenient forum was not open to him when the suit
was commenced in New York. The majority state view,90 and the
federal rule as enunciated in Hoffman v. Blaski,91 is that the doctrine
is not available in such a case.92
In the one post-Silver appellate division case which explicitly con-
sidered the issue, Barry v. American Home Assurance Co.,93 relief was
granted over a vigorous dissent which argued that a showing that the
plaintiff could have availed himself of the alternative forum, but did
not, should be a precondition to the granting of forum non conveiens
dismissal.94 In its subsequent per curiam affrmance of Barry,95 the
Court of Appeals failed to consider the issue raised by the appellate
division dissent. That dissent, however, poses the possibility of substan-
89 The value of permitting the parties to determine the forum in which they will
litigate was fully recognized in Export Ins. Co. v. Mitsui S.S. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 436,
274 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1st Dep't 1966). This reasoning is now reinforced by the persuasive
precedent of a recent Supreme Court decision, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972), which held such clauses binding on federal courts sitting in admiralty
unless the plaintiff could meet a heavy burden of showing that enforcement would be
unreasonable, unfair, or unjust. See generally 58 CoRNri. L. REv. 416 (1972). Potential
inequities in the application of the Zapata rule could be overcome by permitting a plain-
tiff to show that his consent was procured through manifest bargaining inequality, and by
declaring forum selection clauses unreasonable as a matter of law in consumer contracts.
See Schlesinger, supra note 80, at 324-25.
90 Cf. State-Court Jurisdiction 1012-13.
91 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
92 The federal rule, however, is based entirely on interpretation of the federal venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970), which limits transfer to districts in which the action
"might have been brought." From a policy standpoint, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in a
companion case, Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), would appear more persuasive.
Justice Frankfurter argued that once the defendant has consented to transfer (or the
court has accomplished the same result by conditioning its dismissal), the substantive
purposes underlying forum non conveniens would be advanced by transfer (or dismissal),
"while there is no way in which the plaintiff can be prejudiced by the lack of venue ...
or the impossibility... of serving the defendant there." Id. at 354.
93 38 App. Div. 2d 928, 329 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Ist Dep't 1972) (memorandum opinion).
94 Judge Kupferman, dissenting, said that
[iln a case such as this, where the defendant seeks to have the assistance of the
court for the purpose of transferring the action, it should first be shown that the
plaintiff was given the opportunity to avail herself of the alternative and refused.
Once the plaintiff has made a reasonable choice of a forum, and at the time of
the commencement of the action, she, in fact, had no other choice, the court
should not intervene.
Id. at 928-29, 329 N.Y.S2d at 918. Contra, State-Court Jurisdiction 1012-1.
95 Barry v. American Home Assurance Co., 31 N.Y.2d 684 (1972).
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tial judicial disagreement on this issue. If it were the intention of the
Court of Appeals to sanction forum non conveniens dismissal in such
a situation, it should have been considerably more explicit.
Of far greater value than such patchwork repairs would be the
initiation of a comprehensive study of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine by the legislature or the Judicial Conference. Professor Rudolf
Schlesinger underscored the need for such a study, and suggested its
proper focus, when he noted that a major bar to the effective use of
forum non conveniens
lies in the fact that most courts and writers treat the doctrine...
as if it were a single, monolithic rule. It would be far easier to reach
sensible, reasonably predictable results if the problem were broken
down into smaller segments, predicated on categories and criteria
related to the nature of the substantive claim for the trial of which
the court seeks to establish the appropriate forum.96
One possible means of accomplishing this breakdown for forum
non conveniens review would be to classify suits according to the
method by which jurisdiction over the defendant had been obtained.
For example, in the area of in personam jurisdiction, cases based on
implied consent would normally be inappropriate for forum non con-
veniens treatment,97 except when a contract action was based on an
appropriate forum selection clause 8 or when the claim arose from
business activities conducted outside the state.99 In long-arm cases, the
fact that the injury or the tort occurred within the state would usually
serve as an appropriate basis for retention o An individual defendant
sued in the state of his domicile would ordinarily have no cause for
complaint; similarly, a multistate corporate defendant should bear the
burden of showing that being sued in its state of incorporation or prin-
cipal place of business is unjust.10'
There are, however, two major classes of in personam cases in
96 Schlesinger, supra note 80, at 324.
97 Exacted or implied consent jurisdiction is normally limited to causes of action
arising from an act committed or business transacted within the state. See RESTATE ENT
(SEcoND) or CoNuLICr or LAws §§ 35-37 (1971).
The major exceptions are for torts committed outside the state but having effects
within the state (see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972); notes 34-35 supra;
text accompanying note 100 infra), and for nonrelated business activities when the busi-
ness done in the state is continuous and substantial. See RsrATEmENT (SEcoND) or CoN-
ruer or LAws § 35(3) (1971); note 99 and accompanying text infra.
98 See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
99 See, e.g., Antonana v. Ore S.S. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Bagdon v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916).
100 See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
101 Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 80, at 324 n.55. But cf. State-Court Jurisdiction 1011.
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which a presumption should be made that New York will be an inap-
propriate forum for trial. The first class includes those suits falling
under what is commonly known as the "transient rule of jurisdiction,"
in which in personam power arises from the presence of the defendant
within the state's borders, jurisdiction is conferred by the service of
process, and there is no other connection to the forum. 0 2 The second
class encompasses cases arising under the New York procedural rule, 0 3
enunciated in Bryant v. Finnish National Airline,104 in which jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state claim is grounded solely on the defendant's
unrelated business activities. In addition to these two classes of in
personam cases, quasi-in-rem suits based on Seider-type attachments'0 5
should also normally be appropriate for forum non conveniens dismis-
sal.
One procedure which might be applied to actions falling within
one of the Bryant- or Seider-type classifications would be that employed
by the Supreme Court as to forum selection clauses'---the normal
presumption of convenience would be reversed and the plaintiff re-
quired to come forward with evidence showing that New York was
indeed an appropriate forum for trial.10 7 The reviewing court, in the
exercise of its discretion, would of course be permitted to retain juris-
diction of such a case when circumstances warranted-or, conversely,
to allow forum non conveniens dismissal when the plaintiff had failed
to meet the burden of proof.10 8 But the risk of nonpersuasion would be
shifted to the party by whom it should most properly be borne. In ad-
102 Schlesinger, supra note 80, at 314; State-Court Jurisdiction 1009.
103 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1972), provides that "[a] court may exer-
cise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised hereto-
fore."
104 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); accord, Frummer v.
Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 923 (1967).
105 See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
106 See note 89 supra.
107 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
108 The decision of the Court of Appeals to permit the lower courts latitude in
receiving and evaluating evidence as to the propriety of forum non conveniens relief in a
specific case has substantial merit. See note 65 and accompanying text supra. Although
categorization of the main headings of the doctrine will assist these courts in reaching
reasonable and consistent results by (1) suggesting whether the case is likely to have the
"substantial nexus" with New York which will permit its just resolution within the forum,
and (2) instructing the courts as to which party should have the burden of going for-
ward to rebut the presumption which arises (see text accompanying note 97 supra),
allowing them to consider and weigh any relevant evidence which tends to rebut this
presumption in the case before them will ensure that the inflexibility of the former rule
is not replaced by the tyranny of a new set of rigid standards.
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dition to the immediate objective of promoting consistent and reason-
able results throughout the courts of the state, implementation of these
standards, or others developed through a comprehensive study, would
serve to establish New York as a leader in the development of a work-
able system of interstate venue. 0 9
CONCLUSION
Parochial discrimination between residents and nonresidents was
for a long time the primary obstacle to effective utilization of forum
non conveniens in New York. Its amelioration, through Silver and
Rule 327, will now permit the state's courts to evaluate forum non
conveniens pleas in most cases with reference to the values which justify
the doctrine.
Beyond its obvious benefits, this reform has served to highlight
related issues also in need of reconsideration. Some, such as the New
York attitude toward the contractual forum selection clause, merit
prompt judicial attention; but the ultimate objective of a truly com-
prehensive and progressive forum non conveniens policy will only be
reached through a thorough examination of the potentialities of this
doctrine and its complex interrelationship with other procedural
policies. Such a study should focus not only on finding methods by
which the doctrine may be easily and consistently applied, but also on
the proper position of the factor of residence in an enlightened forum
non conveniens policy.
Charles P. Schropp
109 Legal writers have stressed the need for such a system for many years. Among the
reforms proposed have been federal legislation (see Ebrenzweig, supra note 69, at 513)
and systemization and extension of forum non conveniens rules. See Schlesinger, supra
note 80, at 322-27. Decisions such as Silver indicate increasing awareness of the short-
comings of the present situation, and make it appear inevitable that some type of reform
will eventually be enacted. If New York were to assume leadership in bringing about
such reform, it would undoubtedly have a large voice in determining the form it should
take.
